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1Introduction
The economic crisis began in the last quarter of 2008 and has severely hit the automotive sector. Global sales in all
market segments dropped significantly, in part because the credit crunch inevitably affected an industry where customers
often rely on credit for their purchases.
The challenges linked to the recession have exposed the various weaknesses of the sector overall, and of individual
companies. In this sense, restructuring has accelerated. But the effects of the global downturn have been felt in very
different ways in different areas of the world. The downturn is expected to have greater consequences in advanced
economies than in emerging ones. This report compares the world’s three most important automotive production areas
and markets (Japan, the EU, and the US) and includes some information from three of the most promising areas for
development of the automotive sector in the near future (Brazil, China and India). The impact of the recession on the EU
automotive sector is dealt with in greater detail in another Eurofound report (Pedersini, in press).
Economic downturn in the automotive sector: the impact worldwide
As can be seen in Table 1, the world economic crisis has had a remarkable effect on the automotive sector. The slowdown
reversed a growth trend, which had persisted since the early 2000s, reaching a peak of more than 73 million motor
vehicles produced worldwide in 2007. Output began to drop in 2008, down some three million vehicles on the previous
year (-4%), but the actual slump came in 2009, with a further drop in output of almost 10 million vehicles (or -13.5%
on an annual basis). In two years, worldwide output dropped by nearly 17%.
Table 1: World motor vehicle production 2004–2009 (millions of vehicles)
Source: The International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA), different years, http://www.oica.net/, accessed on
27 April 2010
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Percentage
change
2004–2009
Percentage
change
2007–2009
EU27 18.45 18.39 18.67 19.72 18.44 15.25 -17.3 -22.7
EU15 16.85 16.47 16.28 16.69 15.17 12.24 -27.4 -26.7
EU NMS 1.59 1.92 2.39 3.03 3.26 3.01 88.9 -0.7
Other Europe 2.38 2.43 2.73 3.13 3.34 1.76 -26.2 -43.9
Russia 1.39 1.35 1.51 1.66 1.79 0.72 -47.9 -56.5
Turkey 0.82 0.88 0.99 1.10 1.15 0.87 5.6 -20.9
NAFTA 16.26 16.32 15.88 15.45 12.94 8.76 -46.1 -43.3
US 11.99 11.95 11.26 10.78 8.69 5.71 -52.4 -47.0
South America 2.56 2.99 3.21 3.70 3.94 3.78 47.3 2.0
Brazil 2.21 2.53 2.61 2.98 3.22 3.18 44.0 6.9
Asia and Oceania 24.09 26.83 28.19 30.71 31.51 31.75 31.8 3.4
China 5.07 5.71 7.19 8.88 9.30 13.79 172.0 55.3
India 1.51 1.64 2.02 2.25 2.33 2.63 74.2 16.8
Japan 10.51 10.80 11.48 11.60 11.58 7.93 -24.5 -31.6
Africa 0.42 0.52 0.57 0.54 0.59 0.42 -1.3 -23.5
Total 64.17 66.48 69.26 73.27 70.76 61.71 -3.8 -15.8
2However, it is interesting to note that in 2008 the recession was felt essentially in the EU15 and in the US (Figure 1). In
the EU15 during 2007, production declined by 9% and by nearly 20% in the US. In Japan, output stalled. In all the other
areas output continued to grow. 
In 2009, the fall in production was widespread and included the whole of Europe, including non-EU countries, with a
steep decline in Russia and a remarkable drop in Turkey. In Japan, output dropped by more than 30%. The exceptions
to this general downward trend were Brazil, China and India. In Brazil, output levels were almost unchanged. The only
countries that continued to expand production and were able to dramatically accelerate their pace of growth were India
(which boosted its production by 13%) and China (by 48%). China’s very high increase in output clearly signals the
potential role it can play in the future in the automotive sector. In 2009, Chinese production levels have been surpassed
only by the total EU27 output and have exceeded those of both Japan and of the countries in the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Figure 1: The impact of the economic downturn on automotive production – percentage change over previous year
Source: OICA
If a longer-term look is taken at production trends since the early 2000s (Figure 2), two diverging tendencies can be seen
– on one hand, the traditional strongholds of the automotive sector (Japan, the EU15 and the US) and, on the other, the
emerging players in Europe, Latin America and, particularly, Asia. Indeed, in the first group of regions, the stagnation
of production dates back to at least the early 2000s. In the US, production has been actually declining for some time.
There has been substantial stagnation in EU15 countries and output had only marginally increased in Japan before the
recent dramatic fall. This is probably due to the saturation of markets and emerging overcapacity.
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3Social dialogue and recession in the automotive sector: a global perspective
Central and eastern European countries have attracted significant investment in the automotive sector and the European
Union’s new Member States (NMS) had witnessed a remarkable increase in output, which has been halted and even
reversed by the economic crisis. The same can be said for non-EU countries in the region, especially Russia and Turkey,
which were selected by a number of European car manufacturers for establishing joint-ventures and partnerships,
although growth here was slower. Here the fall in production levels due to the recession has been even more evident: in
Russia, output has more than halved compared with 2007, while in Turkey output has dropped by 20%. 
Success stories can be found in emerging countries such as India, and especially in China where there was an impressive
increase of almost 50% in output between 2009 and 2008. Brazil was also able to resist the recession and maintain its
pre-crisis production levels. These are probably the areas where the prospects for market development will remain more
positive in the medium-to-long term.
Figure 2: World motor vehicle production 2004–2009 (Index, 2004 = 100)
Source: OICA, different years, http://www.oica.net/, accessed on 27 April 2010
Restructuring and internationalisation of the industry
The automotive industry is made up of truly global players. As shown by Table 2, most of the major manufacturers –
also known as original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) – have production locations in different areas of the world.
This is partly the effect of early development. US-based OEMs established subsidiaries in Europe from the early 1900s
onwards, while the same companies and some European OEMs expanded into Latin America mainly after 1945. But a
broader and more significant move towards globalisation of the industry has come about in recent decades through
numerous developments:  the strengthening of production locations in Mexico within the NAFTA region; the creation of
Japanese ‘transplants’ in the US and Europe – usually green-field plants established by transnational companies, which
bring organisational and human resource management (HRM) practices developed in the home country with them; the
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4increase of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the automotive sector in central and eastern Europe; and the recent opening
up of the Indian and Chinese markets. These trends should be seen in combination with the simultaneous increase of
outsourcing in the industry, and the tendency to establish production bases with a tight integration of manufacturers and
suppliers, close to the final market so that logistical costs are reduced while models can be more easily adapted to
demand.
As traditional markets decline to the benefit of emerging markets, such market shifts will probably further sustain the
globalisation of the automotive industry and provide the opportunity for a general reorganisation of production chains
and clusters.
Table 2: Passenger car production by major OEMs in 2008 (units)
Source: OICA, http://www.oica.net/, accessed on 27 April 2010
Figure 2 shows the present differences among OEMs in terms of the distribution of production across large regions.
Whereas a certain degree of internationalisation can be found in each case, there are still many large producers that
remain essentially concentrated in their area of origin. GM is probably the most global player because it already produces
most of its cars outside the US, particularly in Asia through Daewoo and joint-ventures in China. GM also maintains
important production locations in Brazil and, of course, Europe. Other internationalised OEMs include Fiat-Chrysler,
Renault and Honda. Tata is an unusual case, producing more than half of its passenger cars in Europe because of its
recent acquisitions of Jaguar and Land Rover, while maintaining its original core plants in India.
The economic recession has accelerated restructuring and the rebalancing of production across different areas and also
provided some opportunities to redefine global partnerships. The best example of this is perhaps the acquisition by Fiat
of a controlling minority stake in Chrysler – an initial 20%, which will certainly increase to 35% and possibly to 51%.
Other instances include the failed takeover of Opel/GM Europe by a Magna-Sberbank joint venture, or the acquisition
of Volvo Cars (formerly owned by Ford) by Geely, an emerging but still relatively small Chinese manufacturer, which
ranked tenth in China’s passenger car sales figures in 2009.
Social dialogue and recession in the automotive sector: a global perspective
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Group EU Other
Europe
Asia North
America
South
America
Oceania Africa Total
Toyota 561,686 126,596 5,554,476 1,207,801 92,051 141,447 84,576 7,768,633
GM 1,510,750 160,599 2,106,315 1,543,624 588,442 105,527 - 6,015,257
VW 3,896,396 62,234 871,795 449,098 738,938 - 91,654 6,110,115
Honda 230,423 50,065 2,044,483 1,421,427 132,542 - - 3,878,940
Ford 2,066,468 - 208,102 793,101 242,587 36,303 - 3,346,561
PSA 2,076,296 9,815 506,968 - 245,765 - 2,040 2,840,884
Nissan 405,598 - 1,598,765 776,521 - - 7,748 2,788,632
Fiat-Chrysler 1,159,397 81,030 5,089 501,251 631,891 - - 2,378,658
Hyundai 12,042 80,960 2,189,881 152,588 - - - 2,435,471
Suzuki 284,875 - 2,009,186 12,374 - - - 2,306,435
Renault 1,202,064 334,490 263,859 8,906 207,045 - 32,058 2,048,422
BMW 1,221,197 - - 170,741 - - 47,980 1,439,918
Daimler 1,143,214 - - 152,561 33,070 - 51,246 1,380,091
Tata 258,807 - 230,935 - - - - 489,742
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Figure 3: Passenger car production of major OEMs by main regions in 2008 (millions of units)
Source: OICA, http://www.oica.net/, accessed on 27 April 2010
Other important partnerships were concluded between the end of 2009 and early 2010 and they demonstrate how the
present situation is being addressed by motor companies with a new wave of corporate restructuring. Of particular
relevance is the deal made in December 2009 by Volkswagen to acquire a 19.9% stake in Suzuki which, in turn, controls
Maruti, one of the two major Indian motor companies. Volkswagen’s aim is to establish a close long-term partnership
with them. Renault concluded a partnership and cooperation agreement in early April 2010 with Mercedes, which
envisaged the exchange of between 3% and 5% equity. Similarly, PSA Peugeot and Mitsubishi started to consider ways
in which they might consolidate their already established collaboration on a number of projects, including the joint-
ownership of a plant in Russia. It has been suggested that PSA Peugeot may acquire a substantial stake in Mitsubishi
(30%–50%).
These developments add to a number of partnerships already established: that between Renault and Nissan, with cross-
ownership that gives Nissan 44% of Renault, and Renault 15% of Nissan; the controlling stake of GM in Daewoo; the
participation of 25% of Renault in AvtoVAZ; the partnership between Ford and Mazda, despite Ford’s reduction of its
stake in Mazda from 33.4% to around 11% in November 2008, and its current view of the alliance as purely a financial
investment – an attitude that demonstrates the changing nature of alliances; and several joint-ventures set up for specific
plants and projects worldwide and that involve most OEMs. Of particular relevance among this type of partnership are
the joint-ventures established with the major Chinese OEMs by some of the most important global players, such as
General Motors (with SAIC), Volkswagen (SAIC and FAW), Toyota (FAW), Hyundai (BAIC), Ford (Chang’an), Honda
(Guangzhou), Nissan (Dongfeng), and PSA-Peugeot (Dongfeng). The web of subsidiaries and partnerships is becoming
quite dense and this will probably be a key element of future strategies to adapt to shifting markets, overcapacity and
new technologies.
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2010
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6The growing importance of emerging countries as production locations is clearly demonstrated by Table 3 and Figure 4,
which show the relevance for certain leading OEMs of five of the most important growing economies: Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa, the so-called BRICS countries. As mentioned above, these areas have been involved in
quite a different way in the recent economic downturn, especially in the automotive sector. Russia has been badly hit by
a car production slump, whereas China has seen booming growth. India has had moderate growth, Brazil’s production
levels are static and South Africa has remained marginal in the global automotive industry.
Such divergent trends are reflected in the different results of the world’s leading OEMs: those such as GM and VW,
which have concentrated their investment in China, have shared in the remarkable growth there, helping to
counterbalance somewhat the reductions in advanced economies; other OEMs such as Renault and Fiat, which focused
production investment in Russia and Brazil, could not benefit from this effect.
Table 3: Passenger car production in BRICS by major OEMs, 2009 (number of vehicles)
It is interesting to note that BRICS production already represents between one fifth and one third that of most OEMs.
The exceptions are: Toyota, whose main locations remain in the advanced economies; PSA and Renault, which produce
mainly in Europe; and the high-end producers BMW and Daimler, whose core production units are still located in
Germany. It is expected that the importance of BRICS will consolidate in the next few years as the problems of
overcapacity and stagnating demand characterise the business environment in advanced economies.
Social dialogue and recession in the automotive sector: a global perspective
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Group Brazil Russia India China South Africa BRICS World
Toyota 63,951 - 51,151 595,449 40,018 750,569 6,148,794
GM 742,950 - - 1,243,572 59,529 2,046,051 5,902,583
VW 490,124 23,102 65,930 1,734,765 17,146 2,331,067 4,997,824
Honda 135,180 - 61,281 601,920 - 798,381 2,984,011
Ford 241,673 - 32,515 335,174 20,621 629,983 2,952,026
PSA 111,132 - - 262,889 - 374,021 2,769,902
Nissan 11,921 - - 523,001 9,063 543,985 2,381,260
Hyundai - - 559,620 814,852 - 1,374,472 4,222,532
Suzuki - - 876,115 240,547 - 1,116,662 2,103,553
Renault 117,814 51,394 5,827 - 4,041 179,076 2,044,106
Fiat 607,096 - 23,711 - - 630,807 1,958,021
BMW - - - 15 46,240 46,255 1,258,417
Daimler 15,224 - - 3,588 41,400 60,212 1,055,169
Total major
OEMs
2,537,065 74,496 1,676,150 6,242,402 220,158 10,750,271 40,778,198
Total all
OEMs
2,576,628 595,839 2,166,238 10,383,831 222,981 15,945,517 47,952,995
Percentage of
major OEMs
98.5 12.5 77.4 60.1 98.7 67.4 80.5
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Figure 4: Passenger car production in BRICS by major OEMs – share in 2009 (%) and change from 2008 (percentage points)
Employment
While trends in employment are obviously influenced by developments in production, short-term changes in
employment levels tend to be limited by productivity and efficiency gains, and by labour hoarding. Gains in productivity
and efficiency reduce employers’ need to hire new workers to cope with increased production levels in times of
economic expansion. And, in times of economic downturn, employers engage in labour hoarding, since they anticipate
recovery and prefer to avoid redundancy costs and to keep skilled labour. Of course, the ability to increase productivity
is linked to technological and organisational developments. And the degree of labour hoarding that a company can afford
is closely linked to national institutional frameworks and whether these frameworks offer the means to help companies
manage sharp decreases in demand without recourse to massive lay-offs; in the EU, for instance, there is a variety of
publicly-subsidised working time reduction schemes.
Table 4 shows how the tendencies in sectoral employment in the different economic regions under review echo the
analysis of production levels. The EU15 and the eastern and central European NMS have divergent trends. (Cyprus and
Malta do not have significant automotive sectors). While in the EU15 employment in the sector has slowly declined
despite the stability of production up until 2007, in the NMS there was a steady increase in employment in the
automotive industry. However, it must be stressed that 2008 data are not strictly comparable with previous years due to
a series break. Japan’s employment figures for the sector closely follow the global production trends, with a significant
rise in employment until 2007 and a contraction in 2008. It should also be noted that a significant share of automotive
jobs are ‘atypical’ and are therefore not included in the present figures. It is estimated that ‘non-regular workers’ account
for as much as 30% of employment in OEMs and up to 50% in component suppliers. As explained below, the relative
stability of industry employment in a period marked by a remarkable decrease in production can also be explained by
the concentration of job losses among those in ‘non-regular’ employment. In the US, there has been a decline in
employment, as in production, since the early 2000s. This trend has dramatically accelerated during the recent downturn,
dropping to fewer than 900,000 jobs in 2008 and to some 670,000 in 2009, 60% of the sector’s 2003 employment level.
In Brazil, the growth of production has been accompanied by a proportionate increase in the number of sectoral jobs.
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2010
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8Table 4: Employment in the automotive industry, 2003–2008
Note: * break in series, for 2008; the change to NACE rev.2 makes the figures not strictly comparable with previous years.
Sources: Japan, Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association; US, US Bureau of Labor Statistics (Current Employment Statistics
survey - National); Brazil, EIRO; EU15 and NMS, Eurostat (Structural business statistics).
Figure 5: Recent trends in automotive employment, 2003–2008
Note: 2003, the index = 100; 
* break in the series for NMS and EU15; for 2008, the change to NACE Rev.2 makes the figures not strictly comparable with previous years.
Sources: Japan, Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association; US, US Bureau of Labor Statistics (Current Employment Statistics
survey - National); Brazil, EIRO; EU15 and NMS, EUROSTAT (Structural Business Statistics).
The global automotive sector amid recession
The European Union
The European Union is a major player in the global motor industry, accounting for about 25% of all vehicle manufacture
(Table 1). The core of Europe’s automotive industry is in those countries that played a major role in the early
developments of the sector. Germany is by far the EU’s biggest producer of motor vehicles (Table 5). In 2007, when
vehicle manufacture and sales peaked worldwide, Germany alone produced around a third of all vehicles made in
Europe. Three quarters of Europe’s overall output was manufactured in 2007 by the EU’s five major vehicle producers
– Germany, France, Spain, the UK and Italy, each making more than one million vehicles.
Social dialogue and recession in the automotive sector: a global perspective
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009
EU15 1,927,659 1,918,485 1,892,608 1,819,148 1,800,159 1,987,197*
NMS 311,685 339,357 355,407 392,108 429,164 435,106*
Japan 725,000 746,000 819,000 850,000 895,000 866,000
US 1,125,300 1,112,800 1,096,700 1,070,000 994,200 875,500
Brazil 273,417 317,747 335,956 374,995 427,912 447,859
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Yet between 2005 and 2007, jobs and production in the sector were already beginning to shift from western Europe to
central and eastern Europe. While vehicles produced there accounted for less than 10% of Europe’s overall output in
2004, by 2009 central and eastern European countries were producing one fifth of the EU’s total output (Table 1).
However, Germany has shown its strength in this sector, being the only one of the five major vehicle-producing countries
to have increased production levels and cut relatively few jobs between 2005 and 2007. In the same period, output has
been reduced by 15% in France and by around 10% in Belgium.
Table 5: The automotive industry in the EU, 2007, and variation 2005–2007
Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/, data retrieved on 30 January 2010) and European Automobile Manufacturers’
Association (ACEA) (http://www.acea.be/, data retrieved on 24 February 2010)
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Number
employed
(2007)
Number
vehicles
produced (2007)
Number cars
produced
(2007)
Change in
employment,
2005–2007 (%)
Change in vehicle
production,
2005–2007 (%)
Change in car
production,
2005–2007 (%)
Germany 847,925 6,213,460 5,709,139 -2.2 7.9 6.7
France 254,916 3,015,854 1,284,312 -7.5 -15.0 -18.1
Italy 169,217 1,284,312 910,860 1.6 23.7 25.5
United Kingdom 165,946 1,750,253 1,534,576 -13.9 -2.9 -3.9
Spain 155,057 2,889,703 2,195,780 -3.0 5.0 4.7
Poland 135,161 784,615 695,000 24.7 28.0 28.7
Czech Republic 121,936 937,648 925,060 17.2 55.7 55.0
Sweden 85,326 366,020 316,850 -0.3 7.9 9.8
Romania 63,571 241,712 234,103 4.5 24.1 34.1
Hungary 56,009 292,027 287,982 30.5 92.1 93.9
Belgium 44,829 834,403 789,674 -5.3 -9.9 -11.8
Slovakia 34,126 571,071 571,071 46.5 161.5 161.5
Austria 33,850 228,066 199,969 1.7 -10.0 -13.2
Slovenia 10,050 198,402 174,209 20.4 11.5 25.9
Portugal : 176,242 134,047 -20.3 -2.6
Netherlands 22,857 138,568 61,912 0.7 -23.3 -46.2
Finland 7,071 24,309 24,006 2.8 12.3 13.1
Denmark 6,711 - - 7.7
Norway 4,788 -0.1
Ireland 3,582 - - 6.6
Bulgaria 2,906 - - -13.9
Greece 2,872 - - 1.5
Estonia 2,393 - - 15.2
Lithuania 1,427 - - 60.0
Latvia 1,334 - - 39.8
Cyprus 251 -0.8
Luxembourg :
Malta :
10
The changes in the distribution of production across European countries are part of the automotive sector’s globalisation
of production, and they reflect two distinct trends in manufacturing strategy: the search for cheaper skilled labour, and
a shift towards new or emerging markets. Combined with the reorganisation of the major automotive groups through
sales and acquisitions and the establishment of partnerships and joint ventures, this has resulted in OEMs being widely
distributed both throughout Europe and outside it (Figure 2).
The current economic downturn has hit every part of the automotive sector hard. Compared with 2007 levels, almost all
countries show a significant drop in production volumes. It is interesting to note that only a handful of countries have
been spared – the two largest and best-established central European producers, the Czech Republic and Poland, and the
two smallest emerging ones, Slovenia and Romania, where 2009 figures may show that production has overtaken
Hungary’s. Slovakia and Hungary seem to have been severely hit by the recession.
Figure 6: Change in production volumes for passenger cars, 2007–2009 (%)
Source: ACEA, http://www.acea.be/
Despite the significant fall in production, the impact of the present economic downturn on employment levels remained
in general relatively limited, especially in countries where tools are available to manage short-term variations in demand,
such as short-time working in Germany (kurzarbeit), partial unemployment in France (chômage partiel), the wage
guarantee fund in Italy (Cassa integrazione guadagni) and the Employment Adjustment Procedure (Expediente de
Regulación de Empleo) in Spain. In these cases, employers – often jointly with trade unions – can cushion the immediate
effects of diminishing sales and output. By using the various forms of reduced working hours allowed for by national
legislation or collective bargaining, most of the OEMs have been able to limit redundancies in the core labour force.
Indeed, many company collective agreements deal with just this issue and often include a commitment to preserve
employment. In France, this has also been part of an agreement with the government concerning broad sectoral
interventions. However, the reduction in fixed-term and temporary agency employment has been widespread and has
been reported in many countries including France, Italy, and Slovakia. In some cases, voluntary departures backed by
economic incentives to relinquish jobs have provided further scope for employment adjustments. Of course, the
Social dialogue and recession in the automotive sector: a global perspective
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cushioning effects of fleet-renewal bonuses in some European markets has to be taken into account, and without them it
is possible that reorganisation and restructuring would have gone much further.
Industrial relations
The automotive industry is a central component of the manufacturing sector. For much of the 20th century it consisted
of very large vertically-integrated producers with plants often employing thousands of workers. Generally, the industry
had well-established industrial relations with collective bargaining agreements and widespread union representation. The
‘de-verticalisation’ of production of recent years has eroded bargaining coverage through restructuring, downsizing,
increased outsourcing, and the shifting of production into locations where trade unions are traditionally weaker, such as
central and eastern Europe. Patterns of union representation and collective bargaining are increasingly influenced by the
choices of OEMs about which parts of the manufacturing process to outsource and where production units should be
located. However, despite the increasing fragmentation of industrial relations and the globalisation of production, the
role of industrial relations and trade unions remains important especially within OEMs. For instance, union membership
in the automotive sector, in the EU and elsewhere, is almost always higher than in the manufacturing sector as a whole
and the national average.
Of course, levels of union membership depend on a nation’s industrial relations system, and in the EU, levels range from
some 90% of the workforce in Sweden to around 20% in France, and even less in some eastern European countries. The
prevalence of company-level bargaining in certain cases, such as in the UK and in central and eastern European
countries, can fragment collective representation, but also reinforces the relative strength of industrial relations within
each company, particularly the larger ones. Sometimes the key role of OEMs has favoured the emergence of company
unions. This has happened, for instance, in Hungary, France and Italy (Pedersini, in press).
Collective bargaining is widespread in the automotive sector, particularly within OEMs. All the major companies have
well-established company-level bargaining, which in many cases supplements industry-wide agreements such as those
covering the metalworking sector. Some exceptions are the UK and Hungary where there is no sectoral bargaining, and
Spain – where the major OEMs have their own company agreements. In Spain, this is also true of the large first-tier
suppliers, while the SMEs producing components are usually covered by relevant industry-wide agreements at
provincial level.
The importance of the presence of unions in the main automotive companies has put industrial relations at the centre of
restructuring in many EU countries. Between 2008 and 2009, all automotive companies had to introduce specific
measures to address the fall in demand. In France, the framework for company-level adjustments was set by the
‘Automotive Pact’ signed in 2009 by the Automobile General States (Etats généraux de l’automobile, which united the
social partners and the government) and by a renovation of the partial unemployment scheme. The Automotive Pact
included the provision of €6.5 billion of low interest public loans to provide Renault and PSA Peugeot with a credit line
of €3 billion each, and to establish a Modernisation Fund for Automotive Suppliers (Fond de modernisation des
équipementiers automobile, FMEA). Access to the €6.5 billion credit line has been linked to commitments to maintain
employment levels, invest in ‘green’ technology and strengthen cooperation with automotive suppliers. As for partial
unemployment, in April 2009, faced with the economic downturn, the government improved conditions for workers and
raised reimbursement levels for employers, introducing particularly favourable conditions for the automotive sector.
Collective bargaining at sectoral and company-level has developed out of this framework. In March 2009 a special
agreement, ‘A social contract for the crisis’, was signed by Renault’s management and four union organisations: CFDT,
CFTC, CFE-CGC, and CGT-FO (CGT did not sign). The agreement introduced new rules for implementing the partial
unemployment scheme, and aimed to ensure full pay for workers on partial unemployment. In April 2009, the PSA
Peugeot management and five union organisations (CFDT, CFTC, CFE-CGC, CGT-FO and GSEA –  again without
CGT) agreed a 100% salary guarantee for workers in partial unemployment for up to six months. During that time,
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workers would be offered formal training to improve their employability. The initiative was to be financed jointly from
unemployment insurance, the government and the company. In July 2009, the company management and all six trade
unions signed a further agreement to pay 90% of the wages of workers on partial unemployment without any time limit.
If workers agreed to forgo annual leave, they could receive 100% of their usual wage. Under this agreement, the
company also committed itself to guaranteeing employment security for at least twice as long as the duration of partial
unemployment.
In Germany, 70% of companies in the automotive sector have used short-time working schemes. Such schemes require
a works agreement and often include other measures such as the activation of the hardship clauses in the industry-wide
agreement. At company level, an important cost-cutting agreement was reached at Daimler in late April 2009
(DE0905039I).
1
Daimler had been severely hit by the economic downturn as sales of premium cars and commercial
vehicles and coaches dropped considerably. Year on year, Daimler sales decreased by 22% in the first 10 months of 2009.
As explained earlier, commercial vehicle market segments could not benefit from fleet-renewal schemes and scrapping
incentives. The works agreement of April 2009 secured a number of concessions from workers’ representatives in
exchange for a limited job security guarantee. The deal delivered labour cost savings of €2 million. Details of the scheme
included: the reduction of all employees’ working time by 8.75% without compensation; reduction of the short-time
allowance from 100% of normal net pay to between 80.5% and 93.5% (depending on plant location and each individual’s
short-time working hours); the postponing of a number of pay increases, including those agreed across the sector at the
end of 2008 (DE0812049I); and the suspension of a €1,900 bonus from the 2008 Daimler profit-sharing scheme. The
company guaranteed job security until the end of 2009. Further job security until June 2011 was guaranteed for
employees hired before 2004 in line with a previous cost-cutting works agreement (DE0408102N).
In Hungary, most of the major automotive companies were able to avoid mass lay-offs for the whole of 2009. The
exceptions were Suzuki, which dismissed 1,200 workers, and small components suppliers employing unskilled labour
that could easily be rehired once the recession was over. Redundancy is generally used as a last resort in Hungary,
companies preferring to reduce working time by – for instance – extending the summer or Christmas breaks, as at the
Audi and GM-Opel operations, and by dispensing with temporary agency work and fixed term contracts, in-sourcing as
much work as possible. As the economic recession has deepened, the most common response has been a reduction in
working time, often without compensation. Hungarian trade unions generally put job security before income security
and, despite some criticism from workers in certain cases, company unions have often cooperated with various cost-
reduction measures, possibly because their position has been weakened by the recession.
In Sweden, the role of industrial relations and collective bargaining in supporting reorganisation and protecting Swedish
workers in the automotive sector has been particularly important since 2008. Job losses and restructuring have affected
both OEMs and component suppliers. However, cost-cutting measures and the implementation of a collective agreement
on temporary layoffs are thought to have saved thousands of jobs. In particular, the 2009 sectoral agreement signed by
IF Metall on temporary layoffs has been particularly important (SE0903019I). Other unions criticised the agreement,
fearing an erosion of wage levels. IF Metall has strongly defended the initiative, insisting that it was only meant as a
temporary measure until March 2010; the union has ruled out any extension of the measure, even if employer
associations campaign for its routine use as a tool to support company restructuring.
Social dialogue and recession in the automotive sector: a global perspective
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Among the many companies that have used these temporary layoffs are a number of automotive companies. Volvo Cars,
for instance, signed an agreement immediately after the sectoral agreement was finalised in March 2009 (SE0903019I).
The scheme proved more controversial at Scania, where unions tried to insist on savings being made through a reduction
in shareholder dividends. This was not successful and the unions balloted workers who largely favoured an agreement
on temporary layoffs. This was signed shortly afterwards (SE0906019I).
In the UK, many collective agreements have tried to address the impact of the economic downturn with measures mainly
intended to reduce working hours and labour costs. Reorganisation started early at Jaguar Land Rover, resulting more
from the company’s acquisition by the Tata Group of the former Ford subsidiaries (UK0804039I), than from the
recession. To cope with financial and liquidity problems following the take-over, the company cut 2,500 jobs using a
mix of voluntary redundancy, termination of temporary-agency work contracts, and layoffs. Nissan soon followed suit
and announced a cut of 1,200 jobs. In both cases, despite trade union concerns, union officials have collaborated with
company managers to limit the effects of the crisis on production and employment.
In addition to jobs lost because of changes in company structures, a number of deals introduced ways of reducing
working hours to respond to the fall in demand. Ford, for instance, brought in temporary lay-offs and a reduced working
week at its Bridgend engine factory. It also launched a voluntary redundancy programme to reduce the workforce at its
Southampton van plant. At the Mini plant in Cowley, weekend shifts were stopped. Toyota negotiated a collective
agreement to cut working time and wages by 10% until March 2010. Honda closed its Swindon factory between January
and April 2009, laying workers off on full pay for the first two months and on 60% pay for the following two. When a
voluntary redundancy scheme failed to attract the necessary 500 applicants, Honda also negotiated agreement for a
temporary 3% pay cut over 10 months. In April 2009, the unions and the Jaguar Land Rover company management
agreed on a four-day week and a wage-freeze in exchange for a two-year job security agreement.
In Italy and Spain, the role of industrial relations in addressing the impact of the economic downturn has been relatively
limited and has mainly concerned participation in the activation of the public short-time adjustment schemes, the wages
guarantee fund (Cassa integrazione guadagni) in Italy, and the employment adjustment procedure (Expediente de
Regulación de Empleo) in Spain. In Italy, the main instrument used to cope with the economic recession so far has been
the ordinary wage guarantee fund, an income support measure that can be used by companies –with the agreement of
unions – to cope with seasonal or recession-triggered decreases in demand or with unexpected difficulties which
interrupt production, such as damage caused by bad weather. In the automotive sector, short-term management of the
recession’s impact has largely been achieved through use of the ordinary wage guarantee fund, which only requires
‘implementation agreements’ and not detailed negotiations with the trade unions. It is quite easily accessed and is little
more than an administrative process. Within Fiat’s Italian operation, it involved around 22,000 of its 80,000 workers
during 2009.
In Spain, the impact of the economic crisis was felt relatively early in 2008 and has been particularly severe. The
government started talks with social partners and sectoral trade associations at the end of 2008, which culminated in the
creation of the ‘Comprehensive Plan for the Automotive Industry’ announced by government at the beginning of 2009.
This included a fleet renewal plan – ‘Vive’ II – funded through a European Investment Bank (EIB) credit line. With a
decline in car sales of around 40% since 2007, and even steeper declines for commercial vehicles and buses, the
employment adjustment procedure (ERE) for temporary lay-offs has been widely used instead of terminating contracts.
This procedure, which must begin with consultation with the workers’ committee, allows the company to reduce the
labour force temporarily. All OEMs used the temporary ERE scheme, applying it to approximately 43,000 workers in
2009, with the exception of the VW Navarra plant producing the new Polo, which had been launched in 2009 and was
able to benefit from the fleet-renewal schemes introduced across Europe. In the component sector, more than 300
companies took advantage of the ERE on behalf of more than 60,000 workers. Around 5,000 jobs were lost in 2009,
mainly through the termination of temporary contracts.
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Government support measures
Public support for the automotive sector has been channelled through different levels and by different means. It is
possible to distinguish between national, regional and European levels of support. A key intervention in this phase has
been the support of governments in sustaining market demand through fleet-renewal schemes, which have been
introduced in many countries including France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. The impact of such intervention has
been remarkable in certain cases: in Germany, for instance, registration of new cars increased by more than 20% in 2009
compared to 2008 (Pedersini, in press).
Other actors have given direct help to companies on the supply side. This has happened both at national and European
level, and sometimes at sub-national levels. This kind of support has taken the form of credit, guarantees, or loans at
special rates offered not just by national governments but also by parties such as the EIB or the European Commission
through the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF). Whereas such loans can help companies to address short-
term financial difficulties, most of these credit lines are clearly linked to longer-term objectives such as the ‘Clean
Transport Financial Facility’ of the EIB.
Interestingly, national loans usually include clauses insisting on the preservation of employment levels or working
conditions. The EGF, which is administered by the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal
Opportunities, is specifically intended to ‘support workers who lose their jobs as a result of changing global trade
patterns so that they can find another job as quickly as possible’.
2
The US
The US is certainly one of the most important locations for the automotive sector worldwide, both for production and
for sales. Detroit, Michigan, has been long the symbol, if not the centre, of the world automobile industry. The so-called
Detroit Three – GM, Chrysler and Ford – were the core of the national manufacturing industry, while one (GM) has been
the most important global player in the industry throughout recent decades. Motor OEMs were also an almost unrivalled
domestic stronghold of collective representation and bargaining.
Most of these features have changed in the last decade or so, well before the impact of the recent economic downturn,
which has – possibly – represented the bottom of the recent decline. First, the traditional US-based industry has
experimented with a significant cutback in both production and employment. Total employment in the automotive sector,
including assemblers, manufacturers of bodies and engines and suppliers, has almost halved since 2000, down from
about 1.3 million jobs to slightly fewer than 650,000 in July 2009. Production levels have also been significantly reduced
from around 12 million vehicles in the early 2000s to fewer than nine million in 2008 and even fewer in 2009. In the
meantime, GM was overtaken by Toyota as the world’s leading automotive manufacturer in 2008. The domestic industry
has also changed with the establishment and consolidation of foreign-owned OEMs and the spin-off of component
suppliers from the main players. Delphi and Visteon were transformed into independent companies and later sold in the
1990s by GM and Ford respectively. These developments had an impact on industrial relations too: the new foreign-
owned companies were usually located outside the traditional and highly unionised automotive cluster in Michigan,
since they preferred to establish their green-field plants in the southern states of the US and often pursued union-free
HRM strategies even if they had a tradition of labour-management cooperation in their home countries. At the same time,
the dense network of suppliers, which emerged from the reorganisation of the main OEMs has lower unionisation levels
and a lower incidence of collective bargaining.
Social dialogue and recession in the automotive sector: a global perspective
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Industrial relations and collective bargaining
Since 2003, the unionisation rate in the motor industry has declined from slightly more than 30% to less than 24%, a
level that remains more than twice the general union density in manufacturing and the private sector, but which signals
a substantial erosion of the union presence. The most important union in the sector is the United Automobile, Aerospace,
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, also known as the United Auto Workers (UAW). In certain plants and
bargaining units within workplaces, employees are represented by other unions, such as the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers of America, the United Steelworkers of America, and the International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, covering certain plant locations or specified trades in the industry. Despite the fall in union
membership and density, UAW managed to remain an important player in the Detroit Three, partly because it had
become an important shareholder through its Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association (VEBA) for retiree healthcare
obligations. As will be discussed later in this report, the core of recent negotiations over reorganisation and restructuring
has centred upon retirement benefits because these were placing an ever-increasing burden on company finances.
The drop in sales linked to the recent economic downturn put great pressure on the US automotive industry. While sales
before 2008 remained quite stable at around 16 million vehicles, they fell to 13 million in 2008 and some 10 million in
2009. The economic and financial situation of GM and Chrysler had been difficult for some time because of high
production costs and unimpressive market results: earnings for the Detroit Three fell below 50% of market in 2008. Both
GM and Chrysler eventually filed for bankruptcy in 2009, while Ford survived thanks to a decisive cost-cutting
collective agreement signed in February 2009. While GM and Chrysler both filed for bankruptcy, they followed different
paths thereafter; GM was bailed out by the US government, which took a majority stake in the new company; Chrysler,
meanwhile, also received government support, but the controlling stake was taken by Fiat. Fiat’s objective was to
consolidate its global position but in both cases, as with Ford, industrial relations and collective bargaining played a
crucial role in putting the two companies back into sustainable economic and financial viability.
In general, collective bargaining in the automotive sector follows a traditional structure of pattern bargaining at national
level involving the major automotive domestic players;
3
the first agreement between workers and management at one of
the Detroit Three is used as the basis for negotiations at the other two. Pattern bargaining was traditionally confined to
the Detroit Three, but was later extended to Delphi and Visteon after they were separated from their parent companies.
Indeed, the agreements about the separation of the two supply companies included a number of obligations on the part
of GM and Ford, which significantly intertwined industrial relations with those of the parent companies. In the summer
of 2009, GM bought back four US-based Delphi components operations and Delphi’s global steering business.
The general effects of the financial crisis, coupled with the economic and financial difficulties of the three major
domestic assemblers and of GM and Chrysler, in particular, led to a significant revision of the collective agreements that
had been reached in 2007, and to the modification of the health protection fund for the industry’s retired workers, the
Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association agreements.
The three reorganisation agreements signed in 2009 followed traditional pattern bargaining, with Ford taking the lead.
In 2009, The US government put significant pressure on negotiations when it declared that further aid to automotive
companies would be conditional on the resolution of collective agreements, which would put the companies on a sound
financial footing. This intervention heavily influenced bilateral negotiations at the bargaining table.
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One aspect of discussions about the revision of the 2007 collective agreements that played an important role was the
objective of making labour costs competitive with the non-unionised US locations of foreign OEMs. Concessions agreed
in this round of collective bargaining included lower wages for newly hired workers, a cut in benefits such as paid
holidays and cost of living allowances, lower future wage increases, a reduction in the number of union appointees,
lower child care assistance, less funding for the worker’s retirement healthcare scheme VEBA – with an option for the
company’s contributing up to 50% of the total amount due in equity (its own shares) rather than cash– and lower optical
and dental retirement coverage.
The agreements were ratified by union members, albeit by a narrow margin. The reduction in costs – which also included
the retirement of many senior workers – allowed the sourcing of new production in the US and halted the threat of
delocalisation and offshoring. It must be underlined that demands for further concessions have continued at both national
and plant levels, and include requests for changes to work rules, job classifications, overtime scheduling, alternative
work schedules and subcontracting.
The role of government intervention
The role of the US government in the management of the crisis in the automotive sector was particularly important,
essentially providing financial resources to accompany the bankruptcy and restructuring processes at Chrysler and GM.
It provided significant funds to both Chrysler and GM and these were later mostly converted into equity. In the case of
Chrysler, the government backed the strategic alliance with Fiat, which was seen as the only viable option to secure
Chrysler’s survival. Fiat acquired a 20% stake in the new Chrysler with options to increase its stake to 51%.
The first economic support package to bail out Chrysler and GM was finalised by President Bush because Congress did
not take action in the first months of recession. When the new administration took office, President Obama set up an
automotive task force to assess and examine the crises at GM and Chrysler. Eventually both companies received support
totalling €56.8 billion (USD 80 billion).
4
When the new companies were established in summer 2009, most of the aid
was converted into equity making the US Treasury the major GM shareholder with a 60% holding, and a minority
shareholder in Chrysler with 10%. The VEBA owns almost 20% of GM and 70% of Chrysler.
In addition to federal aid, motor companies received support from individual states. In particular, GM’s decision not to
take production from Lake Orion, Michigan to South Korea was the result of the combination of economic incentives
granted by Michigan State, the federal government support scheme and the new employment and working conditions
introduced by the amendments to the 2007 collective agreement.
Another important government intervention, similar to the various fleet-renewal schemes introduced in Europe, was the
Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS) Act of 2009, better known as the ‘cash for clunkers’ programme,
which granted an individual economic incentive of up to €3,218 (USD 4,500) to replace old vehicles. The budget
assigned to the programme was initially €715,108,000 (USD 1 billion) and the reference period was from 1 July 2010
until to 30 November 2010. The unexpected success of the programme and the amount of requests received made the
Congress vote an additional €1,430,220 (USD 2 million) budget in early August. Despite this, the scheme had to be
closed at the end of August. Overall, the scheme supported the replacement of almost 680,000 vehicles, of which
401,000 were cars, 275,000 light commercial vehicles and 2,000 heavy commercial vehicles. It was estimated that the
programme increased gross domestic product (GDP) by between €2.71 billion (USD 3.8 billion) and €4.7 billion (USD
6.8 billion) and saved or created more than 60,000 jobs. According to the CARS report to Congress, of the sales
benefiting from the programme, the share of domestically manufactured vehicles was 49% (NHTSA, 2009).
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Japan
Japan has a strong automotive sector based on large groups of companies, which traditionally include component
suppliers and sale companies clustered around the OEMs. Such groups are established by means of capital ownership,
business alliances and partnerships. Between 2006 and 2008, the Japanese automotive industry remained the world
leader in production levels. However, the economic recession, which started in the second half of 2008, put the sector
under strain. Japanese companies have significantly reduced output. Both the domestic market and exports have been
affected by the economic downturn: in March 2009, domestic sales and exports were down by 11.5% and 17.2%
respectively compared with the previous year. There has been some restructuring in the sector, but no major
reorganisation. The number of non-regular workers has been significantly reduced, however. For instance, the number
of temporary employees at Toyota in March 2009 dropped by 20% in the first phase of the recession compared with
March 2008.
Industrial relations and collective bargaining
The traditional Japanese model of company-level unions is well established in the automotive industry and in most cases
‘union shop’ agreements make union membership mandatory for all employees covered by trade union law – all regular
employees excluding fixed-term employees, temporary agency workers and part-time workers. Unions in companies
belonging to the same business group form a single federation. Such group federations are then affiliated to the
Confederation of Japan Automobile Workers’ Unions (JAW). Unions in the supplier companies that are not already part
of the assemblers’ groups form a separate Federation of Autoparts Manufacturing Workers’ Unions, and this is affiliated
to the JAW. The JAW is made up of 12 federations of company unions representing 1,120 unions and 757,000 members.
The largest of these unions is the All Toyota Workers’ Unions, which includes 40 company unions in manufacturing and
185 company unions in sales, with a total membership of 308,000 workers.
The main companies operating in the automotive sector in Japan are affiliated to the Japan Automobile Manufacturers
Association (JAMA), which is both the trade and employer association of manufacturers. Since JAMA groups together
the main 14 assemblers, membership density is thought to be close to 100%. There are separate associations for suppliers
(Japan Auto Parts Association), vehicle body manufacturers (Japan Auto-Body Industries Association) and sales (Japan
Automobile Dealers Association), which similarly act as both employer and trade associations. However, it should be
stressed that since there is no national or collective bargaining in Japan, their role as employer organisations is rather
limited.
The JAW and the JAMA engage in talks about general conditions in the sector, but this does not involve collective
bargaining. Collective bargaining, according to the Japanese model, takes place at company level, within the rather loose
coordination of the so-called ‘spring offensive’ (Shunto), which includes consultations between the industries’ union
federations and employer associations on wage increases. Such consultations are then further developed at group level
between union federations and group management. The actual negotiations eventually take place at company level in the
final stage of this three-level consultation system.
In light of the economic downturn, the emphasis was put on employment security and trade unions agreed to overtime
restrictions and temporary layoffs to preserve jobs. However, so far, no major negotiations have focused on managing
recession since the measures have been introduced in the framework of existing agreements and through participation at
company and workplace level.
The government initiatives
The Japanese government introduced a number of measures to help the automotive sector indirectly. This included the
so-called ‘eco-car subsidy’ – economic incentives to buy either hybrid cars or those with better environmental
performance – and a reduction in tax on newly bought environmentally-friendly vehicles for three years starting in 2009.
The eco-car subsidy accounted for around 10% of new car purchases between April 2009 and March 2010.
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2010
18
Other more general measures provided new resources to finance both temporary layoffs, with the introduction of a higher
subsidy and less strict eligibility clauses, and active employment policies. An important additional instrument to cushion
temporary workers from the effects of job reductions was the special programme to provide income security for
temporary agency workers who remain unemployed after the end of their assignments at the user company.
The measures are thought to have had substantial effects both on the domestic car market and on employment levels.
The subsidy and tax reductions have encouraged both domestic sales and the redirection of investment towards the
development of new environmentally friendly vehicles and technologies, especially hybrid ones. The enhanced system
to support temporary layoffs, according to one estimate, could save some 700,000 jobs.
Brazil
The automotive sector was at the centre of the import substitution strategy launched by President Juscelino Kubitschek
in the 1950s. The growth of the motor industry was achieved through high trade barriers, the establishment of foreign
car makers and a vast programme of infrastructure development, which put roads at the centre of the Brazilian transport
system. The automotive sector has remained crucial for the economy and today accounts for almost a quarter of
manufacturing GDP and some 5.5% of the overall GDP. As a result, the Brazilian motor industry is by far the largest in
Latin America, representing more than 80% of total output.
The Brazilian automotive sector is made up of more than 20 manufacturers of cars, trucks, buses and tractors employing
around 110,000 workers in 2008. All the main global players have plants in Brazil. Particularly important are
Volkswagen, Fiat and General Motors, together accounting for the production of more than two million vehicles in 2008.
Brazil first developed the technology for the use of ethanol as fuel in the 1970s and nowadays around 70% of all vehicles
produced in Brazil are equipped with so-called ‘flex’ engines, which can use petrol and ethanol in any proportion. The
component sector is also important in Brazil and in 2008 employed some 225,000 workers.
Just before the crisis developed in the last quarter of 2008, Brazil’s automotive manufacturers were expecting a
substantial increase in output and had expanded their employment levels using fixed-term employment contracts. The
rapid slowdown of the economy and of both the domestic and worldwide motor markets threatened the sustainability of
the employment expansion. Both industrial relations and government intervention were critical in addressing the
situation and overcoming the initial difficulties. Indeed, production volumes in the car industry were not affected by the
recession although the situation has proved far more critical in the component sector; this was as a result of changes in
the exchange rate, which made imported components more competitively priced than those produced domestically.
Industrial relations and collective bargaining
In Brazil, industrial relations are based on sectoral (or occupational) bargaining and no union representation is usually
recognised at company level. Collective bargaining typically takes place at regional or subregional levels. The
automotive sector is a major exception in this respect as, in the main manufacturing locations in the São Paulo
metropolitan area (usually known as ABC, after the names of the three neighbouring cities of Santo André, São Bernardo
do Campo, and São Caetano do Sul), there are broad representation and collective bargaining rights. This is the area
where the automotive sector was originally established in the 1950s, within a manufacturing base that was already quite
well developed. The metalworkers’ union was established here in the 1950s. In the 1970s, it became the leading trade
union in Brazil and was a prime mover in the establishment of the trade union confederation Central Única dos
Trabalhadores (CUT).
The metalworkers’ unions of the ABC region participated in the movement against Brazil’s military regime, and the
strikes called by the union in the late 1970s played an important role in the movement towards the restoration of
democracy in Brazil. Apart from their political objectives, these strikes were directly aimed at gaining recognition at
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company level. Eventually the union succeeded in establishing works councils in the ABC region, which as a result has
developed its own model of industrial relations. It is important to note that in the automotive sector this model essentially
involves the OEMs, while component suppliers mostly follow the standard model of representation and collective
bargaining at sectoral level. In the metalworking sector, union density is quite high and well above the general average
level of 20%: some 60%–70% of workers are union members. The metalworkers unions (which usually have a territorial,
subregional representational domain) are affiliated to five peak associations, the principal one being the CUT, followed
by Union Force (Força Sindical).
There are separate employer and trade associations for both OEMs and component suppliers. The employer associations
are the National Association of Car Makers (SINFAVEA) and the National Association of Autoparts Manufacturers
(SINDIPEÇAS) while the trade associations are the National Association of Vehicles Manufacturers (ANFAVEA) and
the National Association of the Automotive Industry (ABIPEÇAS). Membership density is very high and reaches almost
100% in the case of employer associations. The Brazilian legal system obliges employers to ensure representation,
although not necessarily membership, of employer and union, and collects compulsory dues to finance both trade unions
and employer associations. This system may help to encourage membership. However, it should also be noted that the
majority of dues collected by employer associations are voluntary, the compulsory amount representing only a small
proportion of the overall fees.
In Brazil, the role of collective bargaining in addressing the effects of recession has centred mainly on reducing job
losses. In the car industry, the strong position of trade unions, especially in the ABC region, helped in finding alternative
solutions to redundancies; subsequent swift economic recovery and a rise in domestic sales then made job reductions
unnecessary. In the supplier sector, however, jobs were cut by 10%. In this part of the sector, the position of trade unions
is often weaker than in the OEMs, but the impact of the recession has also been more severe and persistent. A number
of agreements have addressed the issue of employment security and introduced a number of measures intended to lessen
the impact on employment levels. These have included collective vacations, the taking of individual leave entitlements,
reductions in working hours, the utilisation of hour banks, and temporary layoffs.
In the car companies, as explained above, a sensitive issue was the termination or extension of temporary contracts. In
many cases, the temporary contracts could be extended and confirmed, usually by offering incentives to senior
production workers to accept voluntary redundancy. This happened, for instance, at Mercedes Benz, where some 1,400
temporary jobs were saved as a result of the voluntary redundancy of around 1,200 older workers. Similarly, at Ford, the
voluntary departure of 163 older workers made the recruitment of 200 workers possible, while at Volkswagen the effects
of government measures allowed an increase in temporary hirings above initial expectations. In autumn 2009,
employment levels were around 6% higher than in 2008. In the early phases of the recession, before the government
recovery package was passed and started to have an effect, a number of initiatives were used to adjust to lower
production levels, including collective vacations, the hour bank and the reduction or postponement of bonuses.
Government initiatives
The government decided to tackle the effects of the recession in three sectors in particular – construction, appliances and
automotive. (These sectors were chosen for their importance as employers and in their contribution to GDP). The
incentive measures introduced typically included tax reductions and credit enhancement to boost demand. The measures
for the automotive sector were introduced in early 2009 and renewed twice before a phasing-out process was started in
the autumn of 2009 as the sector exited from recession. The outcomes were very positive, especially for the sale of cars.
In practice, the fall in exports (from 23% of total sales in 2008 to 14% in 2009) has been counterbalanced by the increase
in domestic sales encouraged by the government measures. The situation is far less positive for truck and bus
manufacturers, since there has been a decrease in both domestic sales and exports and, as already mentioned, in the
component sector due a fall in worldwide demand and a strong local currency.
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2010
20
India
India is an emerging location and market for the automotive sector. When the industry was opened to foreign direct
investment (FDI) in 1993, a number of global players established production sites in that region. In 2008, India produced
more than two million vehicles. Vehicle assemblers and a significant component sector has been established. The main
domestic producers are Maruti, a subsidiary of Suzuki, and Tata Motor, which acquired Jaguar and Land Rover from
Ford in 2008.
The effects of the recession were felt early in India, with a significant decrease in production, domestic sales and exports.
However, the recovery was quite rapid and had already showed its strength by mid-2009. In the last part of 2009, there
was a two-digit growth in the domestic market, which was supported by a stimulus package introduced by the
government in the form of tax reductions for new cars. In addition, a renewal programme of India's urban bus system
was launched with a view to supporting manufacturing and sales in the passenger vehicle segment of the automotive
industry, which worldwide has been hardest hit by the recession (along with heavy commercial vehicles and tractors).
At the end of 2008, a number of measures were implemented at company level in response to the recession. One of the
main initiatives has been to reduce the level of temporary workers who typically account for between 10% and 30% of
the total workforce and earn wages ranging from a quarter to half of those of regular employees. Further employment
reduction has been achieved through attrition and recruitment freezes. Collective vacations have been used and some
cost-cutting was achieved through a reduction in the wage increase demands put forward during negotiations by trade
unions (car makers are usually highly unionised).
China
The automotive sector in China is growing very quickly. Production has more than doubled since 2003 and domestic
sales reached more than 13 million vehicles in 2009. The industry has been at the centre of national planning. Compared
with the average size of producers in the sector globally, Chinese OEMs are still numerous and relatively small and it is
expected that there will be substantial consolidation in the future. China is regarded as the main emerging market
worldwide. Indeed, the main car manufacturers in China are joint ventures between local actors and global producers
such as Volkswagen, General Motors, Hyundai and Nissan. The three main Chinese automotive groups, producing more
than a million vehicles each, are Shangai Automotive Industry Corporation Group (SAIC), China FAW Group
Corporation (FAW) and Dongfeng.
China’s production and sales figures have not been affected by the economic downturn: in autumn 2009 growth was up
by almost 40% on the previous year. The Chinese government developed a programme for the automotive sector and is
supporting both the consolidation of the industry, aimed at the emergence of a small number of OEMs, and market
development, through reduced taxes. The government is also supporting research and development (R&D) in new fuel
technologies.
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Summary: global responses to the recession
Table 6: Recession, government measures and industrial relations in the automotive sector, 2008–2010
Source: EIRO
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2010
Impact of the recession Government measures Role of industrial relations
EU Significant fall in sales and
production
Fleet-renewal schemes to
support demand
Direct aid rather rare; most
notable case in France
Crucial in most cases but to various degrees. For
instance, in Germany, Sweden and UK, industrial
relations played a key role in both designing and
implementing the responses to crisis; in France, the
role of industrial relations was significant but it
relied heavily on public policies; in Spain and Italy,
the role of public tools to address falls in demand
was particularly important, compared to the weaker
role played by industrial relations.
US Significant fall in sales and
production
GM and Chrysler are forced
into bankruptcy
Loans and equity to bail out
GM and Chrysler
‘Cash for Clunkers’
programme (Car Allowance
Rebate System) to support
domestic sales
The revision of the 2007 Collective agreement and
of the UAW Voluntary Employee Beneficiary
Agreement (VEBA) was crucial to gain economic
and financial viability for Ford, GM and Chrysler.
VEBA acquired 20% equity in GM and 70% of
Chrysler as part of the rescue package for the two
bankrupt companies.
Japan Significant fall in sales and
production
Employment adjustment has
involved mainly temporary
workers
Fleet renewal scheme and tax
reduction
Higher wage subsidies and
lower eligibility criteria for
income support measures in
cases of temporary layoffs
Negotiations focused on employment security
Measures included overtime restrictions and
temporary layoffs
Brazil Production and sales of
passenger cars remained
stable
Production of components
was significantly hit by the
recession. 
Tax reduction and credit
provision to support purchase
of new vehicles
Negotiations focused on employment security
Measures included collective vacation, the use of
hour banks, wage freezes, and incentives for
resignation of senior workers to stabilise younger
temporary workers.
India Limited impact in the second
half of 2008, then production
recovered and continued to
grow
Tax reductions for new cars
Urban renewal programme for
local transport and buses
During the partial downturn
 reduction in temporary employment
 wage freeze
China Production continued to grow Automotive Strategic Plan
envisages a consolidation of
the main OEMs
Tax reduction
There is emerging evidence in the automotive
sector that trade union representation played a role
in defending the interests of their members;
however institutionally there has not been a
significant move towards independent, autonomous
trade union movements and collective bargaining.
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Commentary
This analysis of recent developments in the automotive sector in the countries covered by this report seems to support
the idea that the sector’s expansion will – in the medium term – depend on the growth of emerging markets. In these
countries, the potential for growth in the automotive market is high and government support initiatives do not necessarily
encourage the replacement of older vehicles, as is often the case in the mature, saturated Western markets (in these
markets, fleet-renewal schemes risk boosting demand in the short term but depressing it in the medium term). In
emerging economies, public support tends to favour the development of the overall market and this means that the
potential negative medium-term consequences of support schemes are not likely to materialise in these markets. It is
important to stress that the three emerging areas covered by this study – Brazil, China and India – could overcome the
effects of the global crisis on the automotive sector through domestic demand alone. This is particularly true in India and
China; in Brazil, output levels could be maintained but not increased.
Such general market trends are very important for global motor companies, which will probably direct their development
strategies towards these emerging countries. They will strengthen partnerships and alliances if this can help them to reach
new customers and, at the same time, save on the investment costs – and risks – connected with expanding production
capacity in new prospective markets. The last two troubled years have apparently led to a broad discussion among
automotive companies and to the first steps being taken towards new collaborations and even strategic corporate
alliances.
In the EU, Japan and the US, on the other hand, future prospects seem to depend on technological renewal because the
markets are already saturated. The adoption of ‘green vehicles’ could drive a vast reorganisation of the industry –
especially if electric vehicles become more widely used – and at the same time could open up new opportunities for
growth. In this field, however, it is likely that automotive companies will need significant support from public policies
to encourage the technological shift to greener vehicles. It is this kind of intervention, rather than the introduction of
short time fleet-renewal schemes, that probably represents the main challenge for public support of the automotive sector
in the EU, Japan and the US. This will involve a substantial reorganisation and restructuring of the industry where there
is significant overcapacity, and a shift of production to lower labour-cost locations to neighbouring economic areas.
Hence, the role of industrial relations and of social dialogue will probably be crucial.
It is interesting to note that measures taken through industrial relations and collective bargaining to tackle the effects of
the economic downturn have been very similar worldwide: they typically include working time reductions or flexible
working using hour banks, collective vacations, wage freezes and bonus postponement. Similarities are also visible in
some of the emerging topics about representation and negotiation in the sector, such as the potential division between
regular and temporary workers where the pay and hours of the latter are most affected by economic and financial
difficulties. Of course, there are also some regional peculiarities, such as the importance of health benefits in the US and
the role that the health fund for retired workers (the UAW VEBA) has taken on – possibly temporarily – as an important
shareholder in the main US OEMs. Regardless of these similarities and differences, industrial relations in the advanced
and emerging economies face differing challenges. In emerging economies, the trade unions will try to reap the benefits
of substantial economic growth; in advanced economies, there will be probably a lot of reorganisation (of companies)
and reconversion (of production) required. Any room for improving employment and working conditions will have to
be found in the limited framework of enhanced productivity, efficiency and competitiveness.
In summary, the role played by industrial relations in emerging economies is quite different from that in advanced
economies. In the emerging economies, industrial relations tend to reflect the automotive industry’s development, the
aim being a balanced distribution of growing gains among all the actors involved; in advanced economies, by contrast,
trade unions and employers seek mostly to address complex market and technological challenges, to preserve business
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competitiveness and to ensure better employment and working conditions. In the emerging economies, industrial
relations appear to follow a more traditional and established pattern of ‘distributional bargaining’; in advanced
economies, the prospect of reorganisation and restructuring is the more pressing concern. In both cases, a combination
of public support (albeit tailored to the different situations of emerging and advanced economies) and well-developed
industrial relations seem to present the most promising framework for addressing such distinct scenarios. The examples
of countries with very different economic and institutional systems, such as Brazil, Germany, Sweden, the UK and the
US, show how social partners can come up with old and new solutions, and help support social cohesion in times of
global change.
Roberto Pedersini, Università degli Studi di Milano
References 
NHTSA (US Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration),  Consumer Assistance to
Recycle and Save Act of 2009: Report to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, December 2009.
Pedersini, R., European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound), Social
dialogue and recession in the automotive sector, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, in press.
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2010
EF/10/37/EN A
